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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of the newly introduced science and technology 
innovation board (STIB) on stock valuations in China. This Nasdaq-style board features 
a market-based IPO system that contrasts with the current approved-based arrangement. 
Event study approach shows that A-share firms pertaining to STIB related industries 
increased significantly after the reform announcement. The effect is stronger for Non-
SOEs and firms with higher R&D capacity. Public shareholders of the firms filing STIB 
IPO applications experienced salient growth in their abnormal returns while their 
industry competitors suffered price drops. Financial analysts also broadened their 
company coverages in STIB related industries and revised their market valuation 
forecasts positively in line with the market investors.  
Keywords: China's financial reform, Registration-based IPO system, Science and 
technology innovation board in China, Chinese financial markets.  
JEL Classification Codes: G18, G38, N25, O16. 
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“The detailed rules for a Nasdaq-style start-up board in Shanghai have fueled hopes 
among early-stage companies the new regime could bring about positive changes in 
China’s stance towards raising equity that investors have been seeking…… If 
successful, the board could also position Shanghai as a capital-raising competitor to 
Hong Kong and New York, who between them accounted for 68.7 percent of the 
money raised through Chinese IPOs last year……” 
                   Reuters (February 11, 2019) 
1. Introduction 
China's economic reform over the last four decades has unleashed an unprecedented 
economic development. Meanwhile, its financial system demands a corresponding 
progress to support and promote the economic rise (Levine, 1999; Rousseau & Wachtel 
2000; Beck & Levine, 2004). The Chinese stock market, whose total market 
capitalization ranked the second and the third in the world at the end of year 2017 and 
2018 respectively, has witnessed a long-lasting prosperity ever since its establishment 
in 1991 (Franklin et al., 2018). Yet, the relatively lag of financial market accessibility 
contrasts with the rapid growth of its depth, as evidenced by the indices of financial 
market depth (FMD) and access (FMA) of China in Figure 1. Since the ability of firms 
to access financial market is pivotal in measuring one country’s financial system 
development and the prosperity of the economy (Levine, 2005; Svirydzenka, 2016), 
further reforms become urgent for both the short-run and long-run growth of Chinese 
economy. Chinese financial market accessibility, mainly featured by the initial public 
offering (IPO) system, however, is being widely challenged by its inefficient selection 
rules and process (Johanssona et al., 2017).  
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Under current practices, IPO applications need to respond to restricted and selected IPO 
qualifications, including profitability, cash flow, and asset quality, before formally 
approved by the Public Offering Review Committee of the Chinese Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) (Chen & David, 2013; Song, Tan, & Yang, 2014)1. Inefficient 
allocation during the IPO process is also detected and political connections are found 
to have a strong association with the approval and processing speed of initial public 
offering (IPO) activities in China (Li & Zhou, 2015). Joseph et al. (2014) and Tang et 
al. (2013) show that larger state-owned firms tend to have superior government 
connections and they are more likely to take advantages in IPO process. Thus, China’s 
current IPO system calls for a transition from the approval-based arrangement toward 
a market-based mechanism (Cheng, Ouyang, & Tan, 2009; Cohn & Yinzhi, 2018).  
Echoing such increasing demand, president Xi Jinping officially announced, on 
November 5, 2018, the establishment of the science and technology innovation board 
(STIB) that pilots the registration-based system during the First China International 
Import Expo. China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) later officially issued 
the IPO guidelines for STIB in the evening of January 30, 2019 after the formal 
endorsement by the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission, the 
                                                          
1 According to CSRC current requirements, IPO companies should maintain their profits at an 
aggregate amount of more than RMB 30 million for the last three years; and their cumulative cash 
flows from operating activities for the last three years must exceed RMB 50 million or their cumulative 
operating income for the last three years must exceed RMB 300 million. For the requirements of asset 
quality, IPO company intangible assets (excluding land use rights, marine cultivation rights, and 
mining rights) can not surpass 20% of the net assets at the end of the latest year. 
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highest Chinese national policy maker. Besides the U.S. style registration system, the 
purpose of STIB, as claimed by the regulatory body, is to host companies in technology 
and emerging industries. Firms with growth potentials but experienced temporary 
financial losses are also eligible to be listed in the new board. CSRC is responsible for 
overseeing the filing firms and promoting full public disclosure and it will focus on the 
accuracy of information disclosure rather than firms’ past performances. It is widely 
believed to be one of the most important financial reforms in Chinese market and the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite rise about 5.23% and 9.90% in wake of CSRC 
announcement within the five trading days respectively. 
In this paper, we shed light on shareholder valuations of this financial reform by 
analyzing the stock market reactions. According to the efficient-market hypothesis 
(EMH), stock markets respond instantly to policy shocks, as investors revise their 
beliefs momentarily. Thus, the prospects of the financial reform viewed by rational 
shareholders are indicated by the changes in stock valuations. The channels through 
which financial reform affects the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) are 
also examined by incorporating the potential heterogeneous impacts of the reform on 
different firms pertaining to various firm characteristics.   
Our work finds that the CAAR of the STIB related industries increased significantly by 
0.318% and 0.605% in one-day and three-day window respectively after the official 
IPO guidelines announcement, which shows an optimism for high-tech industry. Firm-
level regression models further detect heterogeneous impacts of firms’ characteristics 
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on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Non state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) 
and firms with higher R&D capacity also reacted positively in response to the reform 
announcement. 
One typical concern of the event study approach employed above is that investors’ over 
and under-reaction could be overlooked (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Hirshleifer & 
Subrahmanyam, 1998), even after the adjustment of size and beta (Chopra et al., 1992). 
These biases are also detected during the announcement of public policies (Bernanke 
& Kuttner, 1995). In emerging markets, Bailey et al. (2003) and Boubaker et al. (2015) 
find heterogeneous responses between analysts and stock market following a financial 
regulatory reform. By using analysts' forecasts, Sharpe (2002) examines the long-run 
valuations effect of inflation. 
Thus, we, accordingly, substantiate our arguments by incorporating analysts’ stock 
valuation based on the financial reform. Our results parallel the previous findings that 
Chinese analysts increased the P/E ratio forecast significantly for all of the companies 
in the market and for the companies that are categorized into the same industries which 
STIB targets after the guideline announcement. 
Loosening the selection process is considered to be the most distinguished feature of 
the STIB, which creates more potential financing opportunities and hence improves 
firms’ market value. We then directly investigate the investors’ valuations of potential 
relaxations of firms’ market financing accessibilities by focusing on the sample firms 
which have ownerships of the firms filing IPO applications. Many high-tech firms 
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rushed into filing applications to STIB after CSRC’s announcement.2  Using hand-
collected data from their official prospects, ownership involvements by the A-share 
firms are detected. By adopting the event study approach again on individual filing date 
announced by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find significantly positive market 
responses in one-day and three-day event windows. Our result is also supported by 
empirical works that a positive valuation effect of parent firms exists when announcing 
carve-out decisions (Schipper & Smith 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Allen, 1998; Hulbert 
et al., 2002). By employing firm characteristics, we demonstrate that the one-day and 
three-day CAR of Non-SOE companies were better than their SOE peers while listed 
companies with higher R&D expenditures growth rate in the past benefited more from 
the event.  
Increasing competitions due to the financial reform could be the only “downside”, 
which harms the incumbents that directly compete with the firms that are eligible to be 
listed in the STIB. Existing literature finds that publicly traded industry competitors in 
the market experience negative stock returns in responses to their industry rivals’ 
successful IPOs and positive stock price responses to their IPO withdrawal (Akhigbe, 
Johnston, & Madura, 2006; Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl 2010). Hulburt, Miles, and 
Woolridge (2002) echoes the evidences from competitors of carve-out parent firms by 
showing the negative announcement-period returns after the announcements of equity 
                                                          
2 As of May 19, 2019, there are 109 companies submitting their application in STIB according to the 
WIND database. 
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carve-outs. Our results, consistent with previous studies, display a significantly 
negative stock return of the competitors listed in the main board after the announcement 
of IPO applications to STIB and the negative CAR was stronger for applicants issuing 
relative larger shares. 
Our study relates to the existing literature in several folds. First of all, we are among 
the first studies targeting on the influences of registration-based system reform in 
financial market from emerging countries, while existing literatures mainly focused on 
financial regulatory policy changes and how it could promote market efficiency (Henry, 
2002; Ángeles & Manzano, 2014; Huang, Li, & Chen, 2019). Our research develops 
current financial regulatory policy literatures by targeting on financial reform that 
systematically change from approved-based to registration-based system. We also 
deepen out study through how emerging financial markets would react to this 
significant financial shock, as well as how firm characteristics could affect the extent 
of this market reaction. Second, our study extends IPO literatures by considering the 
impact of announcement of potential IPO participants on financial market and how this 
financial reform could improve IPO efficiency while most of studies concentrated on 
IPO company characteristics, firm performance, as well as inefficient IPO policies 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002; Joseph et al., 2007; Tian, 2011; Song, Tan, & Yang, 2014). 
Third, our study supplements the existing research which mainly concerns how 
government subsidy program support high-tech company (Wallsten, 2000; 
DÉMURGER  et al., 2002; Howell, 2017) since high-tech firms in many countries are 
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struggling with financial constrains for R&D and innovation (Hall, 2002; Himmelberg 
& Petersen, 1994; Bond, Harhoff, & Reenen, 2003). We, on the other hand, focus on 
how financial market was functioned by the government to financially support high 
tech companies.  
2. Background and Significance of the Events 
In order to improve its overall efficiency and allocation of capital of the market, the 
Chinese financial reform has been launched since the initiation of the security market 
in 1990. Tradition reforms for Chinese financial regulatory framework normally 
initiated from over-restrictive to over-unrestrictive, and then revised by supplementary 
regulations (Cheung, Ouyang, & Tan, 2009)3. The significant reforms in Chinese stock 
market history include: the launch of the restrictions of stock price in 1996; lessening 
stock brokerage fees in 2002; lessening the stamp duty in 2009;  the split-share reform 
from 2005 to 2006; the initiation of margin trading and short selling in 2010, the 
introduction of stock index futures, government bond futures, and the ETF50 options 
in 2010; the start of the small-and-medium sized enterprises board in 2004, the growth 
enterprises market board in 2009, and the New Third Market in 2013;  introduction of 
QFII in 2002, QDII in 2006, and RQFII in 2011; the establishment of the Shanghai-
Hong Kong Connect in 2014, and Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect in 2016. These 
                                                          
3 The over-restrictive regulations could generally screen ill-performed firms and thus protect investors. 
On the other hand, they also create high barriers preventing many small but promising companies from 
going public. At the same time, over-unrestrictive regulations, which allow more companies to enter 
into the capital markets, might also carry underqualified firms for investors (Cheung, Ouyang, & Tan, 
2009). 
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reforms have made great contributions to the Chinese stock market. For example, the 
split-share reform in 2006 converted a large number of non-tradable shares to tradable 
shares in the market thus stimulating stock markets and promoting SOE firm 
performance (Li et al, 2011; Liao et al, 2014) 
In spite of decades of financial reforms in China that have led the regulations more 
market-based, the selection procedure for IPOs is still more inclined to merits, which 
follows case-by-case evaluation systems being strictly supervised by the government 
(Johanssona et al., 2017; Li & Zhou, 2015). A further and deeper financial reform was 
considered to be necessary during the recent decades to further reduce financial 
frictions and constrains, to make a more financial liberalized and marketized Chinese 
security market, and to financially support national economy to grow healthily and 
solidly (Farrell, Lund, & Morin, 2006; Chan, Dang, &Yan, 2012; Peng, 2019; Sandra, 
Walter, & Vandenbussche, 2010). Moreover, the financial reforms are expected to 
channel more funds to private companies and small, medium companies, and high-tech 
initiatives, all of which has been regarded as the engine of growth in China's economy 
(Peng, 2019; Chen, Ke, Wu, & Yang, 2016). Such reforms with more financial 
opportunities would also be anticipated to provide Chinese savers substantially higher 
returns and thus elevate living standards and possibly consumption throughout the 
country (Chen & David, 2013).  
These urgent requests stimulated a major financial reform of the Chinese capital market 
Back to December, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
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announced the authorization of the stock pilot registration system. The progress, 
however, grinded to a standstill in 2017. November 5, 2018, president Xi Jinping, 
officially announced the establishment of STIB and pilot registration system and 
depicted the promising development of this new-established financial market. And on 
January 30, 2019, the CSRC issued the guidelines of implementation of STIB and the 
pilot registration-based system in Shanghai Stock Exchange. According to the 
guidelines, STIB has no rigid requirements for the profits and capital structures of the 
IPO applicants, which fundamentally supports various technological innovations in the 
country4. STIB mainly targets on small and medium-sized technology start-ups and 
strategic emerging sectors with great growth potentials.  
On March 1, 2019, the details of pilot registration-based System were released to further 
emphasize market information transparency and the roles of the CSRC, including the 
oversight on listed firms and possible illegal activities in the new board such as 
fraudulent IPO and false financial statement5. This registration-based system follows 
the US IPO mechanism that provides more flexibilities for stock issuance, trading, and 
                                                          
4 The China Securities Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Jan 30, 2019). “Opinions on the 
Implementation of Establishing a Science and Technology Board and Pilot Registration System in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange”. Retrieved from  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201901/P020190130725847011706.pdf 
5 The China Securities Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Mar 1, 2019). “Measures for the 
Administration of the Registration of IPO Stocks on the Science and Technology Innovation Board (for 
Trial Implementation)”. Retrieved from 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201903/t20190301_351633.htmlThe China Securities 
Regulatory Commission “CSRC”, (Mar 1, 2019). “Measures for the Continuous Supervision of 
Companies Listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board (for Trial Implementation)”. 
Retrieved from http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201903/t20190302_351634.htm 
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delisting, while releasing certain capital constraints of IPO companies (Barth & Jahera, 
2010; Wright, 2002).6  
 
3. Data, Sample, and Methodology 
3.1 Event Study Methodology  
Event study methodology is pervasive in assessing shareholders’ valuation of some 
exogenous shocks based on efficient market hypothesis. Chinese market is functioning 
relatively efficiently since the prices of Chinese securities are strongly connected with 
listed firm fundamentals and the fluctuation of stock prices are as informative about 
future earnings as they are in the American market (Carpenter et al., 2018). Thus, Lin 
et al. (2018) analyzes the stock market response of China’s anti-corruption movement 
while Fisman et al.  (2014) estimates the abnormal return after the interstate frictions 
between China and Japan. Stock market reaction can also be gauged the potential 
impact of financial reforms. Schäfer et al. (2015) and Hackbarth et al. (2015) adopt the 
methods to assess the financial reforms relating the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and 
the subprime crisis respectively. Following MacKinlay (1997), we utilize the single 
factor market model in the main analysis. The results are consistent if employing the 
                                                          
6 The financial accessibilities of high-tech enterprises grow with stronger market inclusiveness, and 
more diversified market functions (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Padilla-Ospina et al., 2018). 
Information asymmetry in IPO is anticipated to be lessened by the involvement of the market investors 
and the influences of IPO companies and its CEO competencies (Gounopoulos et al., 2018). 
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Fama-French three-factor model (1993), following the spirit of Fisman et al., (2014) 
and Wang and Xu (2005). 
In our event study, we use January 31 as T0 since the announcement of the financial 
reform is in the evening of January 30. The [-10, +10] days are selected as the event 
window to do our test. The estimation window is set to be [-180, -30] days. 
3.2 Sample and Summary Statistics 
The initial sample starts with public A share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Financial, “special treatment” (“ST”), and National Equities 
Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ-listed) companies are excluded. All stock returns, 
ownerships, analyst forecasts, and the relevant financial data are extracted from the 
CSMAR database.  
3.2.1 Measures on Firms’ Characteristics 
Industries Related to STIB 
To investigate the possible impacts of the reform on listed firms, various proxies on 
firms’ characteristics are examined through the event studies. First, we identify the 
listed firms who are classified to the same industries that are highly welcome to be 
listed in the STIB. According to the announcement issued by CSRC, the related high-
tech industries were selected based on OECD industry classification, following the 
study from Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016). These companies and their 
corresponding CSRC industry codes (2012) are presented in Table 1. 
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SOE and Non-SOE Firms 
As non-state-owned firms (Non-SOEs) have relative disadvantages in accessing credit 
markets (Song et al., 2011), the financial reform that provides better environment for 
fund raising could relieve the credit constraint of Non-SOE firms more that of the state-
own enterprises (SOEs). Therefore, we distinguish the SOE and Non-SOE firms by the 
code of equity nature provided by the CSMAR.  
R&D  
Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) identified that firms' shareholders would 
expect significantly positive abnormal return after the increase of R&D expenditures of 
their companies, while R&D intensity has also been considered as a major effect of firm 
performance (Lin, Lee, & Hung, 2006). Hence, we also study the influences of R&D 
growth rate and intensity (measured by R&D/Sales) towards CAR of the events. 
Related Firms 
Empirical work supports a positive valuation effect of parent firms when announcing 
carve-out decisions (Schipper & Smith, 1986; Slovin et al., 1995; Allen, 1998; Hulbert 
et al., 2002). To carry out the study of the abnormal returns of the listed firms that are 
shareholders of the potential IPO firms, we select related firms that are recorded by the 
WIND database. Besides, all financial data of the potential IPO firms are from the 
WIND database as well. The number of related firms is 53 (as of May 19, 2019) and 
their names and stock code are listed in Appendix I.  
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Competitor  
As shown by Hsu et al., (2011) and Lee et al., (2011), the incumbents that directly 
compete with the potential IPO firms might be adversely affected. To quantify such 
impact, we manually collected the competitor information from the IPO prospects. 
Appendix II shows the IPO companies as well as their listed business competitors. 
Analysts 
As presented by Derrien and Kecskés (2013), analyst coverage on listed firms declines 
as a result of the real effects of financial shocks and the decline of analyst coverage 
would later aggregate information asymmetry and thus rises the cost of capital. Conrad 
et al., (2006) mentioned analysts are inclined to update their recommendation as large 
stock price increases or major news announced.  Our research followed those research 
tracks and looked at the changes of analyst responses for the event, including analyst 
coverage and research report coverage. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts 
actively tracking and publishing opinions on firms within one year. Report coverage is 
the number of reports tracking and analyzing firms within one year. 
The summary of the key variables of the study are shown in Table 2. 
 
4. Empirical Framework and Results 
4.1 The Market Reaction to the Policy Announcement  
The event study methodology employed shows consistently and significantly positive 
stock market reactions for firms belonging to the related industries. Table 3 shows that 
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CAAR for three-day [0,3], five-day [0,5], and seven-day [0,7] is all significantly 
positive. Figure 2 demonstrates the trends of the CAAR through window [-10, 10] is 
moving upward around T0. The results accord with investors considering the event as 
important and good news to the market. 
4.2 Firm-level Regressions of CAR for the Policy Announcement Date 
Following Fisman et al., (2014), we incorporate the CAR generated from the event 
study to investigate the potential factors that affects the CAR. The regression model, 
which contains various firm characteristics, is stated as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖        (1) 
where  𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the cumulative average abnormal return over the event window 
specified above. 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖  includes the possible factors such as state-
ownership dummy and R&D intensity and growth rate. Firm-level control variables are 
ROA, age, the logarithm of total assets, leverage ratio, and sales growth. We further 
control for industry fixed effects and the standard error is clustered at industry level. 
We first focus on firms pertaining to the industries that are highly likely to be listed in 
the STIB.  
Table 4 shows that non SOE companies have a significantly higher CAR for both one-
day [0,1] and three-day [0,3] event window, compared to SOE companies. The result 
reflects that non SOE could expect more benefits based on the signals of this new event, 
compared to the traditional advantages of SOE. The R&D intensity is also significantly 
positively related to CAR for both one-day [0,1] and three-day [0,3] event window, 
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while R&D growth rate is significantly positively related to CAR for one-day [0,1]. 
Also, the companies with higher R&D growth rate received more market investments 
after the events. The significant result of the interaction item, SOE* R&D growth rate, 
demonstrates that CAR of SOE company is less sensitive to its R&D growth rate. 
In addition to the subsample analysis, we analyze the conceivable causes that affect 
firms that not only belongs to the aforementioned industry, as the financial reform could 
potentially benefits all firms listed in the exchanges by sending a positive signal to the 
whole market. Table 5 presents the significant results for the whole market, which echo 
to the outcomes from the related companies in the state-own natures, R&D growth rate, 
and interaction item SOE* R&D growth rate.  
4.3 The Analysts Reactions to the Policy Announcement  
Also, based on analyst forecasts, we compared P/E ratio for the industries that are 
highly likely to be listed in the STIB before and after event through the following 
regression framework: 
𝑃/𝐸𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖        (2) 
According to regression result as shown in Table 6, in the one-year forecasts, analysts 
revise a significantly higher P/E ratio for the related companies after the event. Later, 
an interaction item 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  was added to this regression and the 
significant result shows that the companies with high 𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 are inclined to 
have a higher predicted P/E ratio after the event. In addition, we extend the study to the 
whole industry to show how the entire market was viewed by the analysts. The result 
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from Table 7 echoes with the one with the related companies, P/E ratio for the whole 
market is significantly higher and the interaction item 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖  is 
positively significant as well. 
The analyst company coverage and report coverage for the related companies before 
and after the event are also studied: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖        (3) 
As shown in Table 8, the results confirm with analysts’ positive attitude toward market 
after the event and show that both analysts and their reports have a significantly higher 
coverage for the industries that are highly likely to be listed in the STIB.  
4.4 The Related Parties’ Reaction on the Prospectus Releasing Dates  
We then investigate the investors’ valuations of potential relaxations of firms’ market 
financing accessibilities. To show the direct effects of relaxations of firms’ market 
financing accessibilities, we look at the CAAR of the listed firms that have ownerships 
of firms filing IPO prospectus. According to the event study result, as shown in Table 
9 and Figure 3, the event window [-3,3], [-1,1], [0,1], and [0,3] all present significantly 
positive responses. That implies stronger financing accessibilities for these 
shareholders in the market and justifies the positive vision of future market as the 
previous study indicated. 
As for competitors of the listed firms (Competitor lists are shown in Appendix II) that 
have ownerships of firms filing IPO prospectus, they experienced a significantly 
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negative CAR in all of event windows (seen in Table 10 and Figure 4). These represent 
that these competitors are facing a worse financial situation in the market. 
4.5 Firm-level Regressions of CAR for the Prospectus Releasing Dates 
To specify the heterogenous impacts, the following familiar regression framework is 
proposed: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑅&𝐷 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖        (3) 
where i refers to those related firms which own shares of the STIB potential 
firms. 𝑅&𝐷 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 and 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 are the average R&D growth rate for the past 
three years and the listed companies’ share proportions of the STIB companies, 
respectively. Similar firm-control variables and industry fixed effects are specified. The 
standard error is clustered at industry level.  
The corresponding results are reported in Table 11 that both average R&D growth rate 
and the number of patents is positively correlated with the amount of CAR, which 
means the higher research expenditures and capacity, the higher market returns 
companies could generate. In this event. issue share percentages, on the other hand, 
present a negative correlation, which shows that higher issuing share percentages in 
STIB could dilute the ownership percentages of the shareholders. 
The regression results for the significant firm characteristics that impact competitors 
CAR are shown in Table 12. It shows that issue share percentages are significantly 
negatively correlated with CAR[-7,7], CAR[-5,5], and CAR[-3,3] of the competitors， 
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which implies that higher capitals that IPO applicants could raise, the lower market 
performance the competitors encountered.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This article investigates the Chinese stock market reactions to the establishment of the 
STIB with the pilot registration-based system. We find significantly positive abnormal 
returns following the policy announcement for related high-tech industries. Further 
regression models show that CAR is higher for non-SOEs and firms with higher R&D 
capacity in both the whole market and related high industry industries. The implication 
of these findings is that non-SOEs and firms with stronger technology and innovation 
could receive more recognitions from the market since the event. Besides, analyst 
attentions and valuations are also studied. The regression models show that analysts 
increase their valuations for the whole market and STIB related industries. Meanwhile, 
the number of the analysts covered these related industries increased. This result is in 
line with the previous market valuation findings. A variety of high-tech companies 
actively respond to the policy by submitting their applications. We then continue our 
investigations of the investors’ valuations of potential relaxations of firms’ market 
financing accessibilities by targeting on the sample firms with the shares of the firms 
filing IPO applications.  Regarding the prospectus releasing day, public shareholders of 
the firms filing STIB IPO applications experienced positive cumulative abnormal 
returns while their competitors suffered from negative ones. These abnormal returns 
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are positively correlated with IPO applicants’ R&D intensity and negatively related to 
the size of issue. This result shows that investors view the potential relaxations of firms’ 
market financing accessibilities as a significant signal for the related parties. 
As the research result shown, this significant financial reform stimulates the 
performance of the Chinese financial market and strengthen both investors’ and 
analysts’ confidences in the market and STIB related industries and companies. This 
will be a strong support for the Chinese financial system since the current approved-
based IPO system is inefficient and incompatible with the China’s gigantic stock market 
capitalization. The STIB is also aligned with national strategies in supporting high-tech 
industries with strong technology and innovation capacity, promising developmental 
prospects, and decent market recognitions. It will be a key ingredient of the “Made in 
China 2025” strategic plan. Meanwhile, the reform also shows a move made by the 
Chinese government to counter U.S. economic sanctions and restrictions on China’s 
technology progression, including tightening rules around intellectual property theft 
and technology transfers. Thus, the development of STIB and future financial reforms 
is paramount importance for China’s future economic growth. Our research provides 
confident evidences of the positive feedback from the market. 
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Figure 1: Indices of financial market depth (FMD) and access (FMA) of China 
 
Source: IMF's Index of Financial Development prepared by Svirydzenka (2016) 
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Table 1 Related High-tech industry distribution 
CSRC 
Industry 
Code 
 
Industry Name 
Number of 
Firms 
Percentage 
of Firms 
I64 Internet and related services 42 4.93 
C26 Manufacture of chemical raw materials and 
chemical products 
178 20.89 
C39 Manufacture of computers, communication and 
other electronic equipment 
224 26.29 
I65 Software and information technology services 74 8.69 
C37 Manufacture of railway, ships, aerospace and 
other transportation equipment 
39 4.58 
M73 Research and experimental development 4 0.47 
C27 Manufacture of medical products 164 19.25 
C35 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 127 14.91 
Total Number of Firms 852 100 
a The industry classification follows The Guidelines for the Industrial Classification of Listed 
Companies (Revised in 2012), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CRSC) 
b According to the STIB announcement issued by CSRC, the related high-tech industries were selected 
based on OECD industry classification. 
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Table 2 Summary Statistic of main variables  
SOE is an indicator variable that equal to 1 if the firm is State-owned enterprise, otherwise it is 0. RD intensity is measured as R&D expenditure divided by sales.  RD 
Growth Rate is the average R&D expenditure growth rate. Sales Growth Rate is the average sales growth rate over most recently three years.  
 ALL firms Related High-tech Industry  
Total  SOE Non-SOE Total SOE Non-SOE 
Variable Mean Std. Mean  Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
RD Intensity 0.01 0.08 0 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
RD Growth Rate 2.88 37.55 0.67 6.22 4.63 50.01 4.67 50.73 0.36 1.43 7.6 65.64 
Sales Growth Rate 26.49 126.27 16.12 108.22 34.18 137.67 24.01 86.38 12.53 25.92 30.08 104.66 
ROA 5.15 5.88 3.83 4.86 5.92 6.28 5.98 6.57 4.87 5.89 6.43 6.78 
Age 20.75 5.58 22.46 5.01 19.76 5.66 19.97 5.54 22.02 5.14 19.13 5.48 
Asset (billion yuan) 19.43 86.4 36.15 134.79 9.7 31.47 8.94 21.62 15.59 34.47 6.21 12.15 
Leverage 0.43 0.2 0.49 0.2 0.39 0.19 0.37 0.18 0.43 0.19 0.35 0.17 
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Table 3 Cumulative average abnormal return for related high-tech industry 
firms 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of related high-tech industry firms 
around policy announcement date (31st January of 2019) are reported. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -30] 
trading days as the estimation window. Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their 
corresponding P-value are reported.  
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-10,10] 812 0.46% 1.048 0.296 2.931 0.003 
[-7,7] 812 0.83% 2.473 0.015 5.705 0.000 
[-5,5] 811 0.63% 2.155 0.033 6.507 0.000 
[-3,3] 812 0.18% 0.758 0.449 1.485 0.138 
[-1,1] 812 0.22% 1.495 0.137 3.931 0.000 
[0,1] 812 0.32% 2.586 0.011 5.750 0.000 
[0,3] 812 0.60% 3.437 0.001 7.001 0.000 
[0,5] 812 0.93% 4.282 0.000 9.223 0.000 
[0,7] 812 1.20% 4.727 0.000 10.683 0.000 
[0,10] 812 0.78% 2.582 0.011 8.908 0.000 
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Figure 2 Cumulative average abnormal return for related high-tech industry 
firm with event window of [-10,10] 
The event date 0 is defined as the policy announcement date (31 January of 2019), Abnormal return 
is computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -30] 
trading days as the estimation window. 
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Table 4 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around policy announcement date for related high-
tech firms 
This table presents the regression explains both 1-day [0,1] and 3-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include the State-owned-
enterprise indicator (SOE), R&D expenditure to sales (RD Intensity) and R&D expenditure growth rate (RD Growth Rate). Control variables are Average sales 
growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), Return on Assets (ROA), firm age (Age), firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). All 
models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOE -0.463** 
  
-0.859 
 
-1.136*** 
  
-1.661**  
(-2.42) 
  
(-1.69) 
 
(-5.52) 
  
(-3.01) 
RD Intensity 
 
5.191** 
    
4.999** 
  
  
(3.10) 
    
(3.08) 
  
RD Growth Rate 
  
0.003*** 0.003** 
   
0.001 -0.000    
(5.14) (3.46) 
   
(0.74) (-0.38) 
SOE*RD Growth Rate 
   
0.372* 
    
0.250     
(2.12) 
    
(1.60) 
Sales Growth Rate -0.006** -0.006** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
-0.005* -0.004 -0.004*** -0.005***  
(-2.59) (-2.70) (-5.67) (-6.60) 
 
(-2.02) (-1.76) (-6.81) (-9.62) 
ROA 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 
 
0.083*** 0.088*** 0.092*** 0.094***  
(6.73) (6.09) (3.83) (3.86) 
 
(7.05) (6.09) (3.55) (3.50) 
Age -0.029 -0.036 -0.000 0.012 
 
-0.001 -0.019 0.012 0.036  
(-1.27) (-1.56) (-0.00) (0.81) 
 
(-0.03) (-0.62) (0.33) (1.21) 
Size 0.577*** 0.533*** 0.116 0.156 
 
0.718*** 0.625*** 0.393 0.474  
(3.82) (3.52) (0.91) (1.11) 
 
(4.92) (4.43) (1.43) (1.56) 
Leverage -0.065 -0.029 0.637 0.725 
 
0.634 0.532 -0.562 -0.394  
(-0.08) (-0.03) (0.41) (0.51) 
 
(0.49) (0.35) (-0.39) (-0.33) 
Constant -12.047*** -11.200** -2.508 -3.389 
 
-15.292*** -13.278*** -7.853 -9.596  
(-3.58) (-3.38) (-0.82) (-1.01) 
 
(-4.98) (-4.93) (-1.16) (-1.30) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 641 641 234 234 
 
641 641 234 234 
R-squared 0.128 0.129 0.126 0.146   0.174 0.164 0.224 0.255 
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 Table 5 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around policy announcement date for 
all firms 
This table presents the regression explains both 1-day [0,1] and 3-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include 
the State-owned enterprise indicator (SOE), R&D expenditure to sales (RD Intensity) and R&D expenditure growth rate (RD Growth Rate). 
Control variables are Average sales growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), Return on Assets (ROA), firm age (Age), 
firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). All models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-
statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOE -0.087 
  
-0.649* 
 
-0.785*** 
  
-1.344***  
(-0.49) 
  
(-1.82) 
 
(-4.22) 
  
(-3.45) 
RD Intensity 
 
-1.484* 
    
0.418 
  
  
(-1.96) 
    
(0.61) 
  
RD Growth Rate 
  
0.002* 0.003*** 
   
-0.001 -0.001    
(1.85) (3.59) 
   
(-0.66) (-0.76) 
SOE*RD Growth Rate 
   
-
0.054*** 
    
-0.108*** 
    
(-3.38) 
    
(-7.59) 
Sales Growth Rate -0.002** -0.002** -
0.004*** 
-
0.005*** 
 
-0.001* -0.001 -
0.004*** 
-0.005*** 
 
(-2.49) (-2.47) (-4.53) (-5.19) 
 
(-1.73) (-1.37) (-3.76) (-4.93) 
ROA 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.124*** 0.121*** 
 
0.041** 0.046*** 0.093*** 0.088***  
(3.85) (3.75) (3.71) (3.63) 
 
(2.65) (2.99) (4.27) (3.94) 
Age -0.010 -0.010 -0.049 -0.038 
 
0.004 -0.009 -0.026 -0.003  
(-0.71) (-0.73) (-1.67) (-1.31) 
 
(0.19) (-0.49) (-0.72) (-0.08) 
Size 0.442*** 0.438*** 0.156 0.211 
 
0.422*** 0.374*** 0.021 0.133  
(5.56) (5.67) (0.86) (1.26) 
 
(3.90) (3.60) (0.07) (0.46) 
Leverage -
1.383*** 
-
1.442*** 
-0.276 -0.068 
 
-0.049 -0.183 -0.266 0.165 
 
(-2.75) (-2.91) (-0.17) (-0.05) 
 
(-0.08) (-0.28) (-0.20) (0.14) 
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 Constant -
9.321*** 
-
9.220*** 
-2.304 -3.563 
 
-9.237*** -
8.189*** 
0.944 -1.626 
 
(-5.40) (-5.47) (-0.60) (-1.01) 
 
(-3.68) (-3.44) (0.13) (-0.25) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,123 2,123 430 430 
 
2,124 2,124 430 430 
R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.192 0.202   0.129 0.122 0.274 0.302 
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Table 6 Analyst forecasting PE of 2018 revise due to policy announcement for related 
high-tech firms 
This table presents estimates from a regression of related high-tech firm characteristics on analyst forecasting 
PE ratio for 2018, relative to industry fixed effects or analyst fixed effect. Independent variables include 
indicator variable (Post) which is defined as 1 if the forecasting is released after the policy announcement date 
of 31, January 2019, equals to 1 if the forecasting is issued before the date, R&D expenditure to sales (RD 
Intensity). Control variables are Average sales growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), 
Return on Assets (ROA), firm age (Age), firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). t-statistics 
associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Forecasting PE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 8.464*** 6.533*** 4.837*** 11.525*** 6.755** 4.927*** 
 
(5.35) (4.12) (4.27) (4.47) (2.84) (3.78) 
RD Intensity 
  
118.479*** 
  
116.708*** 
   
(11.39) 
  
(10.23) 
Post*RD Intensity 
  
63.817*** 
  
58.478*** 
   
(3.50) 
  
(2.70) 
Sales Growth Rate  
 
0.294*** 0.299*** 
 
0.398*** 0.392*** 
  
(2.65) (20.66) 
 
(4.85) (48.78) 
ROA 
 
-1.221*** -0.995*** 
 
-1.132 -0.961*** 
  
(-4.65) (-9.01) 
 
(-1.85) (-8.95) 
Age 
 
0.349** 0.446*** 
 
0.267 0.357*** 
  
(2.31) (4.47) 
 
(1.05) (3.57) 
Size 
 
-3.236*** -2.529*** 
 
-5.186* -4.458*** 
  
(-3.12) (-4.02) 
 
(-2.25) (-6.99) 
Leverage 
 
-10.952 -10.610** 
 
-4.620 -7.710* 
  
(-1.21) (-2.46) 
 
(-0.35) (-1.76) 
Constant 31.468*** 106.655*** 84.463*** 30.855*** 147.345** 126.992*** 
 
(99.27) (4.80) (6.18) (59.77) (2.66) (9.18) 
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Analyst fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed 
effect 
No No No No No No 
Observations 3,466 3,086 3,086 3,466 3,086 3,086 
R-squared 0.639 0.705 0.727 0.127 0.524 0.551 
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Table 7 Analyst forecasting PE of 2018 revise due to policy announcement for all firms 
This table presents estimates from a regression of firm characteristics on analyst forecasting PE ratio of 2018 for the whole market firms, relative 
to industry fixed effects or analyst fixed effect. Independent variables include indicator variable (Post) which is defined as 1 if the forecasting is 
released after the policy announcement date of 31, January 2019, equals to 1 if the forecasting is issued before the date, R&D expenditure to sales 
(RD Intensity). Control variables are Average sales growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate), Return on Assets (ROA), 
firm age (Age), firm size (log(assets)) and debt to assets (Leverage). t-statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Forecast PE 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 6.359*** 5.952*** 5.244*** 7.424*** 7.098*** 5.974*** 
 
(6.95) (6.06) (5.79) (4.53) (4.45) (3.78) 
RD Intensity 
  
117.940*** 
  
146.253*** 
   
(8.85) 
  
(3.90) 
Post*RD Intensity 
  
57.960** 
  
80.337*** 
   
(2.49) 
  
(3.30) 
Sales Growth Rate 
 
0.022 0.022*** 
 
0.068 0.066 
  
(1.02) (4.46) 
 
(1.03) (1.03) 
ROA 
 
-0.858*** -0.783*** 
 
-0.646*** -0.552*** 
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(-5.20) (-9.88) 
 
(-3.08) (-3.21) 
Age 
 
-0.073 -0.029 
 
0.100 0.159 
  
(-0.83) (-0.40) 
 
(0.64) (1.06) 
Size 
 
-1.865*** -1.778*** 
 
-2.695*** -2.517*** 
  
(-5.74) (-5.33) 
 
(-2.80) (-3.06) 
Leverage 
 
-17.473*** -16.631*** 
 
-11.575 -12.636* 
  
(-3.84) (-5.61) 
 
(-1.63) (-1.89) 
Constant 24.565*** 84.289*** 79.573*** 24.373*** 94.850*** 88.274*** 
 
(149.23) (9.49) (10.53) (82.67) (4.53) (5.02) 
Analyst fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,821 8,677 8,677 9,821 8,677 8,677 
R-squared 0.373 0.394 0.404 0.160 0.203 0.222 
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Table 8 The change of analyst attention on related high-tech firm due to policy announcement 
This table presents estimated analyst attention change due to policy announcement. Analyst attention is measured by analyst coverage and 
report coverage. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts actively tracking and publishing opinions on the firm within one year. Report 
coverage is the number of reports tracking and analyzing the firm within one year. Independent variable is the indicator variable (Post) which 
is defined as 1 for fiscal year 2017 and 0 for fiscal year 2018. Control variables include R&D expenditure to sales (RD Intensity), 
log(1+Tobin’s Q), and debt to assts (Leverage). All models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-
statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively 
 Analyst Coverage Report Coverage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post 1.199* 1.288* 3.986*** 4.216*** 
 
(2.20) (2.18) (3.75) (3.79) 
RD Instensity 
 
3.634 
 
7.575 
  
(0.39) 
 
(0.45) 
Log(1+Tobin’sQ) 
 
4.589* 
 
11.122 
  
(2.05) 
 
(1.80) 
Leverage 
 
8.565** 
 
23.344** 
  
(3.07) 
 
(3.40) 
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Constant 10.540*** 2.136 21.170*** -0.169 
 
(42.81) (0.67) (43.97) (-0.02) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,110 1,065 1,111 1,065 
R-squared 0.010 0.037 0.014 0.043 
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Table 9 Cumulative average abnormal return for ownership related listed firms 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of listed firms which are ownership 
related with STIB applicants announced prospectus releasing date are reported. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each 
indicated window. The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] 
trading days as the estimation window. Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their corresponding 
P-value are reported. 
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-3,3] 50 3.90% 4.89 0.000 7.24 0.000 
[-1,1] 51 4.72% 8.97 0.000 12.02 0.000 
[0,1] 51 4.88% 11.37 0.000 16.10 0.000 
[0,3] 51 3.34% 5.49 0.000 11.82 0.000 
[0,5] 51 1.40% 1.88 0.063 9.01 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
[-5,5] 51 1.84% 1.82 0.072 4.27 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
Figure 3 Cumulative average abnormal return for ownership related listed 
firm with event window of [-5,5]  
The event date 0 is defined as the prospectus releasing date, Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. 
The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] trading days as the 
estimation window 
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Table 10 Cumulative average abnormal return for competitors 
In this table, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of competitors to STIB applicants 
around prospectus releasing date are reported. Abnormal return is computed as the difference 
between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. The expected 
return is estimated using market model by setting [-180, -60] trading days as the estimation window. 
Both T-statistic and Patell Z statistic and their corresponding P-value are reported. 
Days No. Firms CAAR T-Statistic P-value 
Patell 
Z-Statistic 
Patel 
P-value 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
[-5,5] 75 -2.47% -2.60 0.011 -4.82 0.000 
[-3,3] 75 -1.71% -2.26 0.026 -3.94 0.000 
[-1,1] 75 -0.76% -1.54 0.127 -1.73 0.083 
[0,1] 75 -0.71% -1.77 0.079 -2.04 0.041 
[0,3] 75 -0.76% -1.33 0.185 -2.31 0.021 
[0,5] 75 -1.00% -1.44 0.153 -2.66 0.008 
[0,7] 75 -1.19% -1.47 0.143 -2.96 0.003 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
[-7,7] 75 -2.92% -2.60 0.011 -4.91 0.000 
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Figure 4 Cumulative average abnormal return for competitors with event 
window of [-20,10]  
The event date 0 is defined as the prospectus releasing date, Abnormal return is computed as the 
difference between the actual daily return and expected daily return over each indicated window. 
The expected return is estimated using market model by setting [-180,-60] trading days as the 
estimation window 
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Table 11 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return around prospectus releasing date 
for ownership related firms 
This table presents the regression explains for 3-day [-1,1], 2-day [0,1] and 4-day [0,3] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent 
variables include R&D expenditure growth rate (RD growth rate), number of total patents (log (Patent), the percentage of newly issued shares 
(Issued share percentage). Control variables include firm size (log (Assets)), debt to assets (Leverage) and Average sales growth rate over 
most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate). All models include industry fixed effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-
statistics associated with coefficients are reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 CAR[-1,1]  CAR[0,1]  CAR[0,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
RD growth rate 0.139**   0.130***   0.161*  
 (2.30)   (2.72)   (1.76)  
Log(Patent)  1.809*   1.341   1.696 
  (1.83)   (1.67)   (1.13) 
Issued share 
percentage 
-0.611*** -0.521***  -0.582*** -0.503***  -0.657** -0.558** 
 (-3.77) (-3.19)  (-4.55) (-3.81)  (-2.68) (-2.26) 
Log(asset) -4.278*** -3.997***  -4.678*** -4.319***  -6.427*** -5.988*** 
 (-2.93) (-2.71)  (-4.05) (-3.62)  (-2.90) (-2.68) 
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Leverage 0.239*** 0.231***  0.193*** 0.188***  0.140 0.133 
 (3.85) (3.64)  (3.95) (3.66)  (1.49) (1.38) 
Average sales 
growth rate 
0.003 0.038  0.005 0.038*  -0.039 0.001 
 (0.10) (1.36)  (0.22) (1.69)  (-0.83) (0.02) 
Constant 57.665*** 45.975**  63.484*** 52.875***  87.050*** 73.825** 
 (3.00) (2.41)  (4.18) (3.42)  (2.98) (2.55) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects   
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
 
Observations 55 55  55 55  55 55 
R-squared 0.386 0.363  0.468 0.420  0.216 0.187 
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Table 12 Regression of firm characteristics on cumulative abnormal return 
around prospectus releasing date for competitors  
This table presents the regression explains for 15-day [-1,1], 11-day [-5,5] and 7-day [-3,3] 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Independent variables include the percentage of newly issued 
shares (Issued share percentage), firm size (log (Assets)), debt to assets (Leverage) and Average sales 
growth rate over most recently three years (Sales Growth Rate). All models include industry fixed 
effect and standard errors are clustered at industry level. t-statistics associated with coefficients are 
reported in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 CAR[-7,7] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-3,3] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Issued share percentage -0.059** -0.057** -0.042** 
 
(-2.07) (-2.26) (-2.08) 
Log(Asset) -1.000 -0.821 0.886 
 
(-0.72) (-0.68) (0.90) 
Leverage 0.015 0.018 -0.088* 
 
(0.23) (0.30) (-1.82) 
Average sales growth rate 0.031 0.005 0.021 
 
(1.18) (0.23) (1.13) 
Constant 8.097 7.476 -9.212 
 
(0.52) (0.55) (-0.85) 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77 77 77 
R-squared 0.085 0.072 0.107 
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Appendix Ⅰ Ownership-related public listed firms 
STIB codea STIB company name Shareholder name Shareholder stock code 
A19004.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 骆驼股份 601311 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 联明股份 603006 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 软控股份 002073 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 誉衡药业 2437 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 仙鹤股份 603733 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 小商品城 600415 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 软控股份 2073 
A19010.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 江苏阳光 600220 
A19010.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 苏常柴 A 000570 
A19010.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 海南海药 000566 
A19012.SH 聚辰半导体股份有限公司 小商品城 600415 
A19012.SH 聚辰半导体股份有限公司 天壕环境 300332 
A19016.SH 烟台睿创微纳技术股份有限公司 宏达股份 600331 
A19016.SH 烟台睿创微纳技术股份有限公司 宏达股份 600331 
A19016.SH 烟台睿创微纳技术股份有限公司 四川成渝 601107 
A19016.SH 烟台睿创微纳技术股份有限公司 康源药业 600557 
A19017.SH 上海泰坦科技股份有限公司 天宸股份 600620 
A19018.SH 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 厦门国贸 600755 
A19018.SH 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 厦门信达 000701 
A19018.SH 深圳传音控股股份有限公司 厦门信达 701 
A19019.SH 优刻得科技股份有限公司 通鼎互联 2491 
A19019.SH 优刻得科技股份有限公司 中衡设计 603017 
A19019.SH 优刻得科技股份有限公司 游族网络 002174 
A19020.SH 晶晨半导体（上海）股份有限公司 创维数字 000810 
A19020.SH 晶晨半导体（上海）股份有限公司 中原高速 600020 
A19020.SH 晶晨半导体（上海）股份有限公司 泰达股份 000652 
A19020.SH 晶晨半导体（上海）股份有限公司 TCL集团 000100 
A19020.SH 晶晨半导体（上海）股份有限公司 新湖中宝 600208 
A19022.SH 厦门特宝生物工程股份有限公司 通化东宝 600867 
A19030.SH 和舰芯片制造（苏州）股份有限公司 江丰电子 300666 
A19031.SH 宁波容百新能源科技股份有限公司 银亿股份 000981 
A19032.SH 安翰科技（武汉）股份有限公司 棒杰股份 2634 
A19032.SH 安翰科技（武汉）股份有限公司 东方创业 600278 
A19034.SH 江苏天奈科技股份有限公司 华闻传媒 000793  
A19034.SH 江苏天奈科技股份有限公司 大港股份 002077 
A19034.SH 江苏天奈科技股份有限公司 新宙邦 300037 
A19034.SH 江苏天奈科技股份有限公司 洋河股份 002304 
A19035.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 蔚蓝生物 603739 
A19036.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 有研新材 600206 
A19036.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 TCL集团 000100 
A19036.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 宁德时代 300750 
A19038.SH 广东嘉元科技股份有限公司 奇信股份 2781 
A19039.SH 西部超导材料科技股份有限公司 西部材料 002149 
A19045.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 神舟信息 000555 
A19045.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 浙江东方 600120 
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A19045.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 银轮股份 002126 
A19045.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 光迅科技 002281 
A19046.SH 虹软科技股份有限公司 通鼎互联 2491 
A19046.SH 虹软科技股份有限公司 美盛文化 2699 
A19046.SH 虹软科技股份有限公司 思美传媒 2712 
A19046.SH 虹软科技股份有限公司 华昌化工 002274 
A19050.SH 中微半导体设备（上海）股份有限公司 中原高速 600020 
A19052.SH 澜起科技股份有限公司 华西股份  000936 
A19052.SH 澜起科技股份有限公司 中原高速 600020 
A19054.SH 福建福光股份有限公司 厦门国贸 600755 
A19065.SH 青岛海尔生物医疗股份有限公司 上海建工 600170 
A19065.SH 青岛海尔生物医疗股份有限公司 中联重科 000157 
A19065.SH 青岛海尔生物医疗股份有限公司 上海临港 600848 
A19065.SH 青岛海尔生物医疗股份有限公司 青岛海尔 600690 
A19110.SH 北京致远互联软件股份有限公司 二六三 2467 
a The STIB code is temporary assigned by Wind database 
Source: Wind database 
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Appendix Ⅱ Public listed competitor firms 
STIB codea STIB name Competitor name Competitor stock code 
A16088.SH 北京宝兰德软件股份有限公司 北京东方通科技股份有限公司 300379 
A16232.SH 苏州工业园区凌志软件股份有限公司 博彦科技股份有限公司 2649 
A16232.SH 苏州工业园区凌志软件股份有限公司 江苏润和软件股份有限公司 300339 
A17172.SH 深圳市杰普特光电股份有限公司 大族激光科技产业集团股份有限公司 002008 
A17172.SH 深圳市杰普特光电股份有限公司 华工科技产业股份有限公司 000988 
A17172.SH 深圳市杰普特光电股份有限公司 武汉锐科光纤激光技术股份有限公司 300747 
A17172.SH 深圳市杰普特光电股份有限公司 武汉精测电子集团股份有限公司 300567 
A17197.SH 深圳市创鑫激光股份有限公司 武汉锐科光纤激光技术股份有限公司 300747 
A17241.SH 上海美迪西生物医药股份有限公司 广州博济医药生物技术股份有限公司 300404 
A17241.SH 上海美迪西生物医药股份有限公司 北京昭衍新药研究中心股份有限公司 603127 
A17241.SH 上海美迪西生物医药股份有限公司 杭州泰格医药科技股份有限公司 300347 
A17241.SH 上海美迪西生物医药股份有限公司 康龙化成(北京)新药技术股份有限公司 300759 
A17241.SH 上海美迪西生物医药股份有限公司 无锡药明康德新药开发股份有限公司 603259 
A17372.SH 江苏联瑞新材料股份有限公司 浙江华飞电子基材有限公司 002409 
A19001.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 普莱柯生物工程股份有限公司 603566 
A19001.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 天津瑞普生物技术股份有限公司 300119 
A19001.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 中牧实业股份有限公司 600195 
A19001.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 上海海利生物技术股份有限公司 603718 
A19001.SH 武汉科前生物股份有限公司 金宇生物技术股份有限公司 600201 
A19004.SH 宁波容百新能源科技股份有限公司 湖南杉杉能源科技股份有限公司 835930 
A19004.SH 宁波容百新能源科技股份有限公司 北京当升材料科技股份有限公司 300073 
A19004.SH 宁波容百新能源科技股份有限公司 厦门钨业股份有限公司 600549 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 大族激光科技产业集团 股份有限公司 002008 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 深圳赢合科技股份有限 公司 300457 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 上海克来机电自动化工程股份有限公司 603960 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 福建星云电子股份有限 公司 300648 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 无锡先导智能装备股份 有限公司 300450 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 广东拓斯达科技股份有限公司 300637 
A19005.SH 广东利元亨智能装备股份有限公司 新松机器人自动化股份有限公司 300024 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 上海天永智能装备股份有限公司 603895 
A19006.SH 江苏北人机器人系统股份有限公司 上海克来机电自动化工程股份有限公司 603960 
A19007.SH 江苏天奈科技股份有限公司 青岛昊鑫新能源科技有限公司 300409 
A19008.SH 烟台睿创微纳技术股份有限公司 浙江大立科技股份有限公司 002214 
A19014.SH 苏州华兴源创科技股份有限公司 武汉精测电子集团股份有限公司 300567 
A19014.SH 苏州华兴源创科技股份有限公司 杭州长川科技股份有限公司 300604 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 江苏恒瑞医药股份有限公司 600276 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 深圳信立泰药业股份有限公司 002294 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 贝达药业股份有限公司 300558 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 北京康辰药业股份有限公司 603590 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 上海君实生物医药科技股份有限公司 833330 
A19015.SH 深圳微芯生物科技股份有限公司 成都康弘药业集团股份有限公司 002773 
A19016.SH 厦门特宝生物工程股份有限公司 安徽安科生物工程(集团)股份有限公司 300009 
A19017.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 格尔软件股份有限公司 603232 
A19017.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 300386 
A19017.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 中孚信息股份有限公司 300659 
49 
 
A19017.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 浙江九州量子信息技术股份有限公司 837638 
A19017.SH 科大国盾量子技术股份有限公司 成都卫士通信息产业股份有限公司 002268 
A19019.SH 二十一世纪空间技术应用股份有限公司 珠海欧比特控制工程股份有限公司 300053 
A19020.SH 深圳光峰科技股份有限公司 青岛海信电器股份有限公司 600060 
A19029.SH 福建福光股份有限公司 中山联合光电科技股份有限公司 300691 
A19030.SH 杭州鸿泉物联网技术股份有限公司 江苏新宁现代物流股份有限公司 300013 
A19030.SH 杭州鸿泉物联网技术股份有限公司 兴民智通(集团)股份有限公司 002355 
A19030.SH 杭州鸿泉物联网技术股份有限公司 慧翰微电子股份有限公司 832245 
A19030.SH 杭州鸿泉物联网技术股份有限公司 北京四维图新科技股份有限公司 002405 
A19040.SH 深圳市贝斯达医疗股份有限公司 珠海和佳医疗设备股份有限公司 300273 
A19040.SH 深圳市贝斯达医疗股份有限公司 深圳开立生物医疗科技股份有限公司 300633 
A19040.SH 深圳市贝斯达医疗股份有限公司 北京万东医疗科技股份有限公司 600055 
A19040.SH 深圳市贝斯达医疗股份有限公司 深圳迈瑞生物医疗电子股份有限公司 300760 
A19040.SH 深圳市贝斯达医疗股份有限公司 鑫高益医疗设备股份有限公司 835758 
A19041.SH 北京木瓜移动科技股份有限公司 华扬联众数字技术股份有限公司 603825 
A19041.SH 北京木瓜移动科技股份有限公司 北京蓝色光标数据科技股份有限公司 300058 
A19041.SH 北京木瓜移动科技股份有限公司 广东佳兆业佳云科技股份有限公司 300242 
A19042.SH 中微半导体设备（上海）股份有限公司 北方华创科技集团股份有限公司 002371 
A19043.SH 赛诺医疗科学技术股份有限公司 乐普(北京)医疗器械股份有限公司 300003 
A19044.SH 安集微电子科技（上海）股份有限公司 上海新阳半导体材料股份有限公司 300236 
A19045.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 浙江大立科技股份有限公司 002214 
A19045.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 湖北久之洋红外系统股份有限公司 300516 
A19045.SH 哈尔滨新光光电科技股份有限公司 武汉高德红外股份有限公司 002414 
A19046.SH 杭州当虹科技股份有限公司 北京数码视讯科技股份有限公司 300079 
A19046.SH 杭州当虹科技股份有限公司 深圳市佳创视讯技术股份有限公司 300264 
A19046.SH 杭州当虹科技股份有限公司 北京捷成世纪科技股份有限公司 300182 
A19046.SH 杭州当虹科技股份有限公司 大恒新纪元科技股份有限公司 600288 
A19048.SH 交控科技股份有限公司 浙江众合科技股份有限公司 000925 
A19052.SH 博众精工科技股份有限公司 无锡先导智能装备股份有限公司 300450 
A19052.SH 博众精工科技股份有限公司 深圳市赢合科技股份有限公司 300457 
A19052.SH 博众精工科技股份有限公司 沈阳新松机器人自动化股份有限公司 300024 
A19052.SH 博众精工科技股份有限公司 苏州赛腾精密电子股份有限公司 603283 
A19056.SH 上海晶丰明源半导体股份有限公司 杭州士兰微电子股份有限公司 600460 
A19058.SH 申联生物医药（上海）股份有限公司 内蒙古生物股份有限公司 600201 
A19058.SH 申联生物医药（上海）股份有限公司 中牧实业股份有限公司 600195 
A19058.SH 申联生物医药（上海）股份有限公司 上海海利生物技术股份有限公司 603718 
A19058.SH 申联生物医药（上海）股份有限公司 新疆天康畜牧生物技术股份有限公司 002100 
A19059.SH 广东紫晶信息存储技术股份有限公司 北京易华录信息技术股份有限公司 300212 
A19059.SH 广东紫晶信息存储技术股份有限公司 北京同有飞骥科技股份有限公司 300302 
A19061.SH 恒安嘉新（北京）科技股份公司 北京神州绿盟信息安全科技股份有限公司 300369 
A19061.SH 恒安嘉新（北京）科技股份公司 江苏永鼎股份有限公司 600105 
A19061.SH 恒安嘉新（北京）科技股份公司 任子行网络技术股份有限公司 300311 
A19061.SH 恒安嘉新（北京）科技股份公司 北京天融信科技有限公司 002212 
A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 广州万孚生物技术股份有限公司 300482 
A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 郑州安图生物工程股份有限公司 603658 
A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 武汉明德生物科技股份有限公司 002932 
A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 基蛋生物科技股份有限公司 603387 
A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 深圳迈瑞生物医疗电子股份有限公司 300760 
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A19064.SH 北京热景生物技术股份有限公司 北京利德曼生化股份有限公司 300289 
A19065.SH 苏州瀚川智能科技股份有限公司 上海克来机电自动化工程股份有限公司 603960 
A19066.SH 威胜信息技术股份有限公司 南京新联电子股份有限公司 002546 
A19066.SH 威胜信息技术股份有限公司 深圳友讯达科技股份有限公司 300514 
A19066.SH 威胜信息技术股份有限公司 光一科技股份有限公司 300356 
A19067.SH 北京安博通科技股份有限公司 深信服科技股份有限公司 300454 
A19068.SH 西安铂力特增材技术股份有限公司 先临三维科技股份有限公司 830978 
A19074.SH 视联动力信息技术股份有限公司 苏州科达科技股份有限公司 603660 
A19074.SH 视联动力信息技术股份有限公司 二六三网络通信股份有限公司 002467 
A19074.SH 视联动力信息技术股份有限公司 华平信息技术股份有限公司 300074 
A19074.SH 视联动力信息技术股份有限公司 中兴通讯股份有限公司 000063 
A19075.SH 博瑞生物医药（苏州）股份有限公司 江苏恒瑞医药股份有限公司 600276 
A19075.SH 博瑞生物医药（苏州）股份有限公司 浙江海正药业股份有限公司 600267 
A19075.SH 博瑞生物医药（苏州）股份有限公司 浙江奥翔药业股份有限公司 603229 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 北京北信源软件股份有限公司 300352 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 任子行网络技术股份有限公司 300311 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 启明星辰信息技术集团股份有限公司 002439 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 蓝盾信息安全技术股份有限公司 300297 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 深信服科技股份有限公司 300454 
A19078.SH 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 北京神州绿盟信息安全科技股份有限公司 300369 
A19079.SH 山石网科通信技术股份有限公司 启明星辰信息技术集团股份有限公司 002439 
A19079.SH 山石网科通信技术股份有限公司 北京神州绿盟信息安全科技股份有限公司 300369 
A19079.SH 山石网科通信技术股份有限公司 北京天融信科技有限公司 002212 
A19079.SH 山石网科通信技术股份有限公司 深信服科技股份有限公司 300454 
A19079.SH 山石网科通信技术股份有限公司 杭州迪普科技有限公司 300768 
A19081.SH 上海柏楚电子科技股份有限公司 上海维宏电子科技股份有限公司 300508 
A19082.SH 江苏卓易信息科技股份有限公司 南威软件股份有限公司 603636 
A19082.SH 江苏卓易信息科技股份有限公司 万达信息股份有限公司 300168 
A19082.SH 江苏卓易信息科技股份有限公司 北京银信长远科技股份有限公司 300231 
A19082.SH 江苏卓易信息科技股份有限公司 北京华宇软件股份有限公司 300271 
A19083.SH 张家港广大特材股份有限公司 通裕重工股份有限公司 300185 
A19083.SH 张家港广大特材股份有限公司 北京钢研高纳科技股份有限公司 300034 
A19089.SH 北京沃尔德金刚石工具股份有限公司 长沙岱勒新材料科技股份有限公司  300700 
A19089.SH 北京沃尔德金刚石工具股份有限公司 深圳市中天超硬工具股份有限公司  430740 
A19089.SH 北京沃尔德金刚石工具股份有限公司 南京三超新材料股份有限公司  300554 
A19089.SH 北京沃尔德金刚石工具股份有限公司 富耐克超硬材料股份有限公司  831378 
A19090.SH 广东华特气体股份有限公司 江苏南大光电材料股份有限公司 300346 
A19091.SH 北京天宜上佳高新材料股份有限公司 博深工具股份有限公司 2282 
A19092.SH 北京航天宏图信息技术股份有限公司 合众思壮 2382 
A19103.SH 广东嘉元科技股份有限公司 诺德投资股份有限公司  600110 
A19103.SH 广东嘉元科技股份有限公司 广东超华科技股份有限公司  2288 
A19104.SH 北京佰仁医疗科技股份有限公司 先健科技公司 1302 
A19104.SH 北京佰仁医疗科技股份有限公司 烟台正海生物科技股份有限公司 300653 
A19104.SH 北京佰仁医疗科技股份有限公司 冠昊生物科技股份有限公司 300238 
A19105.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 北京碧水源科技股份有限公司 300070 
A19105.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 博天环境集团股份有限公司 603603 
A19105.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 北京碧水源科技股份有限公司 300070 
A19105.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 安徽国祯环保节能科技股份有限公司 300388 
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A19105.SH 江西金达莱环保股份有限公司 福建海峡环保集团股份有限公司 603817 
A19106.SH 中国铁路通信信号股份有限公司 浙江众合科技股份有限公司 925 
A19107.SH 深圳普门科技股份有限公司 安徽航天生物科技股份有限公司 833607 
A19107.SH 深圳普门科技股份有限公司 江苏奥迪康医学科技股份有限公司 835620 
A19107.SH 深圳普门科技股份有限公司 上海润达医疗科技股份有限公司 603108 
A19107.SH 深圳普门科技股份有限公司 郑州安图生物工程股份有限公司 603658 
A19107.SH 深圳普门科技股份有限公司 深圳迈瑞生物医疗电子股份有限公司 300760 
A19109.SH 北京映翰通网络技术股份有限公司 北京东土科技股份有限公司  300353 
A19109.SH 北京映翰通网络技术股份有限公司 福建星网锐捷通讯股份有限公司  2396 
A19109.SH 北京映翰通网络技术股份有限公司 汉威科技集团股份有限公司 300007 
A19109.SH 北京映翰通网络技术股份有限公司 瑞斯康达科技发展股份有限公司 603803 
A19110.SH 天津久日新材料股份有限公司 湖北固润科技股份有限公司 835595 
A19110.SH 天津久日新材料股份有限公司 常州强力电子新材料股份有限公司 300429 
A19110.SH 天津久日新材料股份有限公司 浙江扬帆新材料股份有限公司 300637 
A19111.SH 南京万德斯环保科技股份有限公司 北京高能时代环境技术股份有限公司 603588 
A19111.SH 南京万德斯环保科技股份有限公司 广西博世科环保科技股份有限公司 300422 
A19113.SH 宁波长阳科技股份有限公司 江苏裕兴薄膜科技股份有限公司 300305 
A19113.SH 宁波长阳科技股份有限公司 江苏双星彩塑新材料股份有限公司 2585 
A19113.SH 宁波长阳科技股份有限公司 康得新复合材料集团股份有限公司 2450 
A19113.SH 宁波长阳科技股份有限公司 航天彩虹无人机股份有限公司 2389 
A19114.SH 江苏浩欧博生物医药股份有限公司 上海科新生物技术股份有限公司 430175 
A19115.SH 锦州神工半导体股份有限公司 福建阿石创新材料股份有限公司 300706 
A19115.SH 锦州神工半导体股份有限公司 常州强力电子新材料股份有限公司 300429 
A19115.SH 锦州神工半导体股份有限公司 宁波江丰电子材料股份有限公司 300666 
A19115.SH 锦州神工半导体股份有限公司 湖北菲利华石英玻璃股份有限公司 300395 
A19115.SH 锦州神工半导体股份有限公司 江阴江化微电子材料股份有限公司 603078 
A19116.SH 北京致远互联软件股份有限公司 上海泛微网络科技股份有限公司 603039 
A19117.SH 三达膜环境技术股份有限公司 天津膜天膜科技股份有限公司 300334 
A19117.SH 三达膜环境技术股份有限公司 天津创业环保集团股份有限公司 600874 
A19117.SH 三达膜环境技术股份有限公司 黑龙江国中水务股份有限公司 600187 
A19117.SH 三达膜环境技术股份有限公司 北京碧水源科技股份有限公司 300070 
A19120.SH 江苏硕世生物科技股份有限公司 厦门艾德生物医药科技股份有限公司 300685 
A19120.SH 江苏硕世生物科技股份有限公司 广东凯普生物科技股份有限公司 300639 
A19120.SH 江苏硕世生物科技股份有限公司 中山大学达恩基因股份有限公司 2030 
A19120.SH 江苏硕世生物科技股份有限公司 上海之江生物科技股份有限公司 834839 
A19121.SH 博拉网络股份有限公司 广东省广告股份有限公司  2400 
A19121.SH 博拉网络股份有限公司 科达集团股份有限公司  600986 
A19121.SH 博拉网络股份有限公司 宣亚国际品牌管理(北京)股份有限公司  300612 
A19121.SH 博拉网络股份有限公司 北京蓝色光标品牌管理顾问股份有限公司  300058 
A19121.SH 博拉网络股份有限公司 利欧集团股份有限公司  2123 
A19122.SH 贵州白山云科技股份有限公司 网宿科技股份有限公司 300017 
A19123.SH 龙岩卓越新能源股份有限公司 荆州大地生物工程股份有限公司 833662 
a The STIB code is temporary assigned by Wind database 
Source: The prospectus released by STIB firms 
 
